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Viewing cable 09STATE28302, S) SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09STATE28302**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09STATE28302	2009-03-24 21:45	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET//NOFORN	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.semana.com/mundo/wikileaks-venezuela-misterioso-vinculo-entre-caracas-teheran/158978-3.aspx>

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8302 0870151
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 242145Z MAR 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 7721-7722
INFO RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY 0298-0299

S E C R E T STATE 028302

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CAPTION ADDED

SIPDIS
NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2034
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MASS](#) [ETTC](#) [TU](#) [VE](#) [IR](#)
SUBJECT: (S) SHIPMENT OF UAVS FROM IRAN TO VENEZUELA

REF: A. ANKARA 3
[1](#)B. ANKARA 126

Classified By: EUR/PRA Dir. Anita Friedt,
Reason 1.4 (b), (c) and (d)

BACKGROUND

¶1. (S//NF) Venezuelan officials expected to receive a shipment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and related material from Iran, via Turkey, by May 2009. As of early March, Venezuelan officials believed that the equipment would be repackaged and labeled as electronic equipment, then transported overland from Iran to Turkey. Once in Turkey, the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime vessel for continued shipment to Venezuela. The U.S. believes this shipment constitutes arms and related materiel, which Iran is prohibited from transferring pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5.

¶2. (S) This case appears to be similar to one from January 2009 where Iran attempted to ship drums of nitrate and sulphite chemicals and dismantled laboratory instruments, which could possibly be used for making bombs to Venezuela via Turkey. In response to U.S. concerns that the shipment may have been a violation of UNSCR 1747, Turkish officials inspected the cargo and made a decision to return it to Iran. (REFS A and B)

ACTION REQUEST

¶3. (S) Drawing from the points in paragraph 5, which may be left as a nonpaper, post is instructed to approach appropriate-level Turkish officials and request that they investigate this activity, and if the cargo is found to be in violation of UNSCR 1747 that the GOT use all available means to prevent the transshipment of this cargo and detain it.

OBJECTIVES

¶4. (S) Post should seek to achieve the following:

-- Provide Turkish officials with information regarding Iran's attempt to ship unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related material to Venezuela via Turkey;

-- Emphasize to the Turkish officials that UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran from transferring any arms or related materiel;

-- Emphasize that these goods are produced by an Iranian entity listed in the Annex to UNSCR 1747.

-- Urge the Government of Turkey (GOT) to take action against this shipment pursuant to UNSCR 1747 and possibly 1737, and in accordance with the GOT's laws and authorities;

-- Thank the GOT for its willingness to interdict and take positive action with regards to a similar shipment in January. As a NATO Ally, we try to provide Turkey with as much info as possible on these issues, which could help lead them to take action in detaining shipments; and

-- Emphasized that, should we receive additional information regarding this shipment, we will provide it as expeditiously as possible.

TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER

¶5. (S//REL Turkey) Begin talking points/non-paper:

--We would like to share some information with you in an effort to highlight a transfer of proliferation concern and to ensure that Iran does not make use of your territory to transfer items proscribed by UN Security Council resolutions 1737, 1747, and 1803.

-- The U.S. has information indicating that Venezuelan officials expected to receive a shipment of UAV and UAV-related equipment from Iran by May 2009.

-- As of early March, Venezuelan officials believed that the equipment would be repackaged and labeled as electronic equipment, then transported overland from Iran to Turkey. Once in Turkey, the equipment would be loaded onto a maritime vessel for continued shipment to Venezuela.

--Venezuelan officials assessed that a shipment of electronics coming from Turkey to Venezuela would be less alerting than a shipment directly from Iran.

--We believe these items are military UAVs and related items, constituting arms and related materials and are thus captured by UNSCR 1747 and subject to the asset freeze called for in UNSCR 1737.

-- UN Security Council Resolution 1747, paragraph 5, prohibits Iran from supplying, selling or transferring any arms or related materiel. It also requires all states to prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not such transfers originated in the territory of Iran.

--This system is produced by the Qods Aviation Industries.

-- Qods Aeronautics Industries (aka Qods Aviations Industries) is designated in the Annex to UNSCR 1747 and as such these items would be subject to the asset freeze provision of UNSCR 1737 regardless of whether the item is MTCR- controlled or otherwise prohibited in paragraphs 3 or 4 of the resolution.

-- As such, we request your assistance in preventing the transfer of goods in violation of UNSCR 1747 and 1737.

-- Additionally, it is possible that some UAV-related equipment may be MTCR-controlled, per MTCR Item 12.A.1., if the equipment is designed or modified to support other Iranian UAVs that meet the Item 1.A.2. or 19.A.2. criteria. Such items are included in document S/2006/815, the list of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology related to ballistic missile programs. Transfer of these items would be a violation of UNSCR 1737 per paragraph 3.

-- We deeply appreciate the Government of Turkey's continued cooperation, support and willingness to enact prompt and thorough efforts in promoting interdictions designed to prevent the transfer of sensitive materials by Iran.

END POINTS.

REPORTING REQUIREMENT

16. (U) Post is instructed to report results of its efforts as soon as possible.

POINTS OF CONTACT

17. (U) Washington points of contact for follow-up are and Margaret Mitchell, ISN/CATR (mitchellmt2@state.gov) and Matt Hardiman, EUR/PRA.

18. (U) Department thanks post for its assistance. Please slug all responses for ISN, EUR, NEA, IO, WHA, and T.
CLINTON